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SECURITY TRANSACTIONS: GUARANTOR'S
WAIVER OF CCP 580b: VALINDA
BUILDERS v. BISSNER
(CAL. 1964)
Valinda Builders v. Bissner' is part of a continuing series of
California decisions reaffirming the protection of purchase money
mortgagors against deficiency judgments. This case specifically held
that a guarantor of a note and deed of trust is protected against
deficiency judgments under Code of Civil Procedure Section 580b,
if the guarantor is, in fact, primarily responsible for the debt, and
the primary obligor is a mere instrumentality of the guarantor; and
if, in a contract for sale of real property, a vendee gives a note
and deed of trust to the vendor to secure part of the purchase price,
and also waives his protection against deficiency judgments provided
by Code of Civil Procedure Section 580b, such waiver is against
public policy and ineffective.'
In 1954 Valinda sold to defendants Bissner and Lownes 17.68
acres of land at $4500 per acre. Defendants formed a corporation
called Trend Homes, Inc. in which defendants and their wives
were the only stockholders. The corporation executed a note and
trust deed in favor of Valinda to cover $67,775 of the purchase
price, and Bissner and Lownes agreed to guarantee the corporation's
payment. Defendants further agreed to waive their protection
against deficiency judgments, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure
Section 580b. Trend Homes then borrowed funds to finance the
construction of houses on the land, and Valinda's trust deed was
subordinated to the security of the construction lenders. The proceeds obtained from the sale of the 53 houses constructed were
used to pay off the higher priority construction loans, and only
$6,801.98 was paid to Valinda, representing.interest on the note and
trust deed. Valinda then brought suit against both Bissner and
1 Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 230 A.C.A. 112, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1964).
2 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 580b now reads: "No deficiency judgment shall

lie in any event after any sale of real property for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to the vendor
to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property, or under
a deed of trust, or mortgage, on a dwelling for not more than four families given
to a lender to secure repayment of a loan which was in fact used to pay all or part
of the purchase price of such dwelling occupied, entirely or in part, by the purchaser.
Where both a chattel mortgage and a deed of trust or mortgage have been given
to secure payment of the balance of the combined purchase price of both real
and personal property, no deficiency judgment would lie under the deed of trust or
mortgage on real property."
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Lownes on the basis of their guaranty. In deciding for the plaintiff
the trial court found
• . .that the Plaintiff and the individual defendants undertook and
agreed that the benefits of Section 580b of the California Code of
Civil Procedure would not accrue to the Defendant herein and that
said individual defendants would not be privileged to defend any
claim on said guaranty by Plaintiff upon the basis of said Section
580b of the Code.3

On appeal the defendants contended that they were really
the primary obligors of the note and trust deed, and that the plaintiff vendor could not look beyond the security for satisfaction of
his claim under Section 580b. The District Court of Appeal agreed
with these contentions and further stated that the defendants'
waiver of their protection under 580b was ineffective to preclude
them from asserting it. In so doing, the lower court's decision that
the defendants, as guarantors, could waive their protection under
580b, was reversed.
In support of its position that the defendants were not guarantors of the note and trust deed, the court cited two similar cases
in which the purchasers of real property were afforded the protection
of Section 580b. In Riddle v. Lushing4 the vendee conducted business through a partnership but was nevertheless considered a principal to the transaction. In In re Wilton-Maxfield Management Company' the purchaser of real property was declared primarily responsible for the payment of the purchase price even though he
literally guaranteed payment by a dummy company. The court
declared Bissner and Lownes primary obligors by stating "It is
thus settled beyond question that one who contracts to buy land
does not alter his identity and relation as purchaser by a purported
guaranty of performance of his own obligation to pay the purchase
price."'
The court invalidated the defendants' waiver of the protection
of Section 580b by citing several cases which held that "Section
580b ... was enacted in the interests of the general public. '"7 It then
cited Civil Code Section 3513 which provides that "a law established
for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement." '
8 Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 230 A.C.A. 112, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1964).
4 Riddle v. Lushing, 203 Cal. App. 2d 831, 21 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1962).
5 In re Wilton-Maxfield Management Co., 117 F.2d 913 (1941).
6 Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 230 A.C.A. 112, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1964).
7 Ibid.
8 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3513, note: The court establishes its public policy argument
by citing among others, such cases as Winkleman v. Sides, 31 Cal. App. 2d 387,
88
P.2d 147 (1939), prohibiting advance waiver of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 726; California
Bank v. Stimson, 89 Cal. App. 2d 552, 201 P.2d 39 (1949), prohibiting waiver of
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Valinda is significant in the context of legislative and judicial attitudes toward deficiency judgments because it reaffirms the
courts' liberal construction of statutes limiting deficiency judgments
to protect the interests of the judgment debtor.9 This is particularly
interesting in view of the Legislature's 1963 amendments to Section
580b which appeared to limit the courts' broader interpretation of
the statute prior to its amendment. Two well known authorities,
Hetland 0 and Riesenfeld," have analyzed the legislative and judicial history of the California statutes limiting deficiency judgments.
It is sufficient to note here by way of summary that the earliest
statutory provision limiting deficiency judgments was Code of Civil
Procedure Section 726, enacted in 1872, which allowed a creditor
only one cause of action against his debtor.' 2 In 1933 the legislature
passed Sections 580a and 580b.11 Section 580a limited the amount
of a deficiency judgment to the difference between the debt and
the fair market value of the security, if the foreclosure was by sale
of the security. Section 580b gave much greater protection by prohibiting deficiency judgments if the debtor was a purchase money
mortgagor. Finally, Section 580d, enacted in 1940, prohibited deficiency judgments after a foreclosure by private sale. 4
Section 580b has been amended three times since its original
enactment in 1933.1 In 1935 it was re-enacted to extend its protection to debtors under contracts of sale, whereas it had previously
applied only to purchase money mortgages and deeds of trust. 6
It was similarly amended in 1949.1" There were, however, serious
ambiguities in the statute which led to judicial construction. In
some instances the courts were strict in their protection, withCal. Code Civ. Proc. § 580; Lucky Investments Inc. v. Adams, 183 Cal. App. 2d 462,
7 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1960) stating, "Whatever the intent of the parties, Adams could
not waive the protection of § 580b in advance." See also Freedland v. Greco, 45 Cal.
2d 462, 289 P.2d 463 (1955) which states: "In Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal. 2d 193, we
held: 'These provisions (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 580-580d, 726) indicate a considered course on the part of the Legislature to limit strictly the right to recover
deficiency judgments, that is, to recover on the debt more than the value of the
security.' " The court summarizes by deciding, "Plaintiff's (Valinda's) reliance upon
the findings that the defendants waived all protection of § 580b must fail. The agreement, if made, was contrary to public policy, void and ineffectual for any purpose."
9 The California statutes limiting deficiency judgments are usually meant to
include CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 580a, 580b, 580d, and 726.
1o HETLAND, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California-A New Judicial
Approach, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1963).
11 RIESENTELD, California Legislation Curbing Deficiency Judgments, 48 Calif.
L. Rev. 705 (1960).
12 CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 726.
13 Cal. Stat. c. 642, § 4-5 (1933).
14 Cal. Stat. Ex. Sess. c. 29, § 2 (1940).

15 Cal. Stat. c. 642, § 5 (1933).
16 Cal. Stat. c. 650, § 5; c. 680, § 1 (1935).
17 Cal. Stat. c. 1599, § 1 (1949).
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holding protection from an independent guarantor," and denying
protection to a vendee whose debt was secured by land other than
that for which the purchase money was loaned.'" In general, however, the courts have been quite liberal in their interpretation of
the statute. For example: the section has been construed so that a
third party lender and mortgagee, other than the vendor of the
real estate, is considered to provide purchase money; 20 an assuming
grantee of the original purchase money mortgagor has been protected,2' as well as the guarantor of a mortgage or trust deed,
provided that he is primarily responsible for the debt;22 finally,
a vendee has been prohibited from waiving his protection under 580b
23
prior to default.
After many years of such judicial interpretation the legislature
acted in 1963 to make the statute more explicit by limiting the debtor's protection to mortgages given "to the vendor . . . or under
a deed of trust or mortgage on a dwelling for not more than four
families given to a lender to secure repayment of a loan which was
in fact used to pay all or part of the purchase price of such dwelling
occupied, entirely or in part, by the purchaser. 2 4 Whether the
courts will find in this 1963 amendment legislative intent, in the
face of an expanding economy, to limit a debtor's previously
broad protection will have to await future decisions. The Valinda
decision appears to indicate no such trend, rather, it seems to point
toward continued judicial protection of the purchase money mortgagor.
H. Kent Frewing
18 Bank of America v. Hunter, 8 Cal. 2d 592, 67 P.2d 99 (1937) ; Security First
National Bank v. Chapman, 41 Cal. App. 2d 219, 106 P.2d 241 (1940).
'9 Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1963).
20 Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953). Bargioni v. Hill,
59 Cal. 2d 121, 378 P.2d 593, 28 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1963).
21 Stockton Say. & Loan v. Massanet, 18 Cal. 2d 200, 114 P.2d 592 (1941).
22 In re Wilton-Maxfield Management Co., 203 Cal. App. 2d 831, 21 Cal. Rptr.
902 (1962).
28 Freedland v. Greco, 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463 (1955) ; Lucky Investments
Inc. v. Adams 183 Cal. App. 2d 462, 7 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1960).
24 Cal. Stat. c. 2158, § 1 (1963).

